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Abstract 
Communications Networks can separate as well as join 
iMormation. This ability can be used to increase 
personal privacy in an environment where advances in 
technology makes it possible to collect and correlate 
increasing amounts of information about individuals. 
The tools and principles necessary to increase personal 
privacy are demonstrated by creating an anonymous 
credit card, in which a person’s identity and purchases 
are separated, and a national health insurance plan, in 
which treatment, payment and an individual’s identity 
are separated. An analysis technique is developed to 
determine how well the irgformation is separated. 
1. Introduction 
As computer memories have increased in size and 
decreased in cost, it has become reasonable to assemble 
vast amounts of information about individuals. As 
computer processors have become more powerful, it has 
become possible to correlate the information that is being 
assembled and to make inferences about individuals. As 
data networks have become ubiquitous and transmission 
rates have increased, it has become possible to combine 
the vast amounts of information that have been 
assembled in different locations, for different purposes. 
Some of the uses of information can be annoying: 
Stores and credit card companies that sell information 
about an individual’s purchases for directed advertising 
can significantly increase the mailings that we receive. 
Some of the uses of information have been made illegal: 
In January 1994 it was made illegal for video rental 
stores in New York State to sell lists of the movies that 
individuals rent. Some of the uses of information may 
change the way our society operates: In the Republican 
party rebuttal to the President’s state of the Union 
message, in January 1994, one objection to a national 
health plan is the potential invasion of an individual’s 
privacy. 
Communications networks give us the ability to bring 
information together. They also give us the ability to 
separate and hide information. Some of the tools that 
make it possible to enhance privacy by communications 
are described in section 2. In section 2.1 a cryptographic 
protocol is described for communicating between two 
parties, and transferring trust between those parties, 
without either knowing the identity of the other. In 
section 2.2 an information analysis procedure is 
described that determines what information can be 
extracted when two or more parties collude. This 
analysis determines the effect when parties misbehave 
and also shows the worse that can happen when there are 
implementation errors. 
Our objective is to control the access to information 
even though the information is needed and available in 
the network. The implementation of an anonymous 
credit card’.2 is described in section 3. The information 
is separated and hidden so that a credit card company 
does not know its client’s purchases or the stores that its 
client shops at, and a store does not know its customer’s 
identity or the credit card company that has paid the bills. 
However, the company that extends credit knows its 
clients identity, the store knows what it has sold to a 
person, and there is a transfer of funds between the store 
and credit card company. 
In the credit card system, anonymity is obtained 
while all of the capabilities of conventional credit cards, 
such as providing detailed billing and challenging 
purchases, are retained. It is also possible to issue the 
equivalent of an electronic subpoena to associate an 
individual’s identity and purchases when there is reason 
to suspect illegal use of the payment mechanism. 
Currently, information about a person’s purchases is 
available unless laws are passed to make that information 
private. With this mechanism, information about a 
person’s purchases are private unless the law is used to 
make it available. 
Three extensions of the basic anonymous credit card 
are digital cash, paying for network services, and 
increased privacy for electronic document distribution. 
When the mechanism is used for digital cash, section 
3.3.1, there is no way to compromise a person’s 
anonymity. However, this mechanism retains the 
protection against loss or theft of a credit card, and is 
more difficult to forge than conventional digital cash 
mechanisms. When paying for network services, section 
3.3.2, this mechanism makes it possible for small 
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venders, who aren’t trusted to receive credit card 
numbers, to sell services. In electronic document 
distribution, section 3.3.3, the anonymous credit card is 
used to balance the interests of readers and publishers. 
Publishers cannot accumulate profiles on what a person 
reads, but can obtain the identities of p p l e  who 
illegally redistribute electronic documents. 
An interesting extension of the anonymous credit 
card is to the the National Health Insurance Plan, in 
section 4. The straightforward application of the credit 
mechanism makes it possible to obtain anonymity when 
paying for services. In addition, it 
- makes health records available anywhere, anytime, 
without disclosing a person’s identity, 
- makes it possible to conduct medical research on 
correlations between diseases and treatments without 
compromising the individuals involved, and 
- allows an insurance company to monitor an 
individual’s treatment without knowing who is being 
treated, unless they have illegally used the system. 
As a result of considering the examples in this paper, 
the collusion analysis that was performed for the 
anonymous credit card has been related to the problem of 
finding paths in a graph, and generalized to take into 
account the difficulty or uncertainty in collusion. The 
generalized collusion analysis is described in section 5. 
2. Tools 
2.1 Double-Locked BOX PrOtW.01 
The double-locked box provides communications 
between two users connected to different computers, or 
wsfers funds between two accounts in two banks, 
without either computer, or bank, knowing the identity of 
the other. Only the bank that the account is located in 
knows the identity of the account, and only the computer 
that the user is connected to knows the identity of the 
user. 
Communications passes through an intermediary, as 
was proposed by Chaum for untraceable electronic mail3. 
The message sender presents the computer he is 
connected to with a box that can only be opened by the 
intermediary. Inside the box is the identity of the 
destination computer and a second box that only that 
computer can open. Inside the second box is the identity 
of the message recipient. 
When funds are transferred from an account in one 
bank to an account in a second bank, the intermediary 
operates as the federal reserve and trust is transferred as 
well as information. A funds transfer between account i 
in bank 1 to account j in bank 2 is demonstrated in figure 
1. When bank 1 transfers amount M to an account 
specified by a double-locked box that the customer has 
provided, it signs the message so that the federal reserve 
can verify that it is from a trusted bank. The federal 
reserve sends a signed message to bank 2 to deposit 
amount M in the account in the locked box. The federal 
reserve is responsible for settling the accounts between 
banks. 
In a funds transfer environment it is particularly 
important to prevent messages from being replayed. For 
instance, if the destination account intercepted the 
message ordering the xxond bank to deposit funds, it 
might be tempted to have the deposit repeated. Two 
standard techniques to prevent replay attacks are 
sequence numbers and challenge response protocols. 
Either public keys or secret keys can be used to construct 
the funds transfer protocol, as described in references 1 
and 2 respectively. 
2.2 Collusion Analysis 
Pieces of information about an individual are placed 
at different nodes in a network in order to make it 
difficult to associate the information. For instance, in the 
anonymous credit card we separate an individual’s 
identity and purchases. Collusion analysis is used to 
determine how well the information is separated. 
The players, such as the banks and intermediaries, 
associate information and messages. For instance, in 
figure 1, when funds are transferred from account i to 
account j 
-bank 1 associates message A with all of the 
- the federal reserve associates bank 1, bank 2, 
-bank 2 associates message B with all of the 
Messages A and B are unique. If bank 1 and the federal 
reserve collude they can combine all of the information 
each associated with message A. The source account 
becomes associated with bank 2 and message B. If the 
combination of bank 1 and the federal reserve then 
collude with bank B, they can combine all of the 
information each associates with message B. The source 
account and destination account become associated. 
Collusion is dependent upon unique information. If 
two players have the same unique piece of information, 
and collude, then they can combine information. For 
instance, if there are a large number of accounts in each 
bank, banks 1 and 2 collude without the intermediary, 
and there is no unique information that is common 
accounts i andj, then there is no reason to associate the 
information in two of the accounts. However, if the two 
accounts have the same social security number associated 
with them, then the accounts can be associated. 
information in account i ,  
message A, and message B, and 
information in accountj. 
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Figure 1. The Double-Locked Box Protocol 
In a real system there is a large amount of 
information and a large number of messages. The 
amount of information that must be considered for 
collusion analysis can be reduced by combining similar 
information. When two pieces of information always 
appear jointly, there is no reawn to consider them 
separately when performing collusion analysis. When 
several messages follow the same path, for the same 
purpose, then the ability to collude, in many instances, 
isn’t improved by considering more than one. Even after 
combining information into common sets, the amount of 
information to be considered for collusion analysis may 
be large. In reference 2, collusion analysis is reduced to 
row reductions and multiplications on binary matrices. 
Automating this process makes it possible to consider 
more complex systems. 
When performing collusion analysis, careful 
consideration must be given to what constitutes 
identifiable information. Suppose a bank logs a charge of 
$4.1 1 at 10:15 AM on 6/14/94, and a store logs a sale of 
the same amount, within a minute of the same time. Can 
this information be used to combine the information at 
the two locations? Depending upon what information is 
considered unique, different results are obtained from a 
collusion analysis. 
3. Anonymous Credit Card 
The anonymous credit card is implemented by 
constructing the electronic equivalent of a credit card 
company, a Swiss bank with anonymous accounts, a 
communication exchange, a federal reserve, and banks 
for stores, as shown in figure 2. The credit card company 
trusts an individual to repay a debt, and knows his 
identity. The sbre knows the merchandise that is 
purchased. The objective is to distribute the information 
so that a number of players must collude in order to 
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associate an individual’s purchases and identity. The 
detailed protocols, including the message formats that are 
transmitted, are described in reference 1. A higher level 
description of the protocol is presented here. 
Credit is extended to the individual by the credit card 
company. The credit card company places credits in the 
individual’s anonymous account using a double-locked 
box that the individual has placed in his credit card 
account. The bank with the anonymous account does not 
extend credit to the individual. This bank trusts the 
federal reserve, which trusts the credit card company. 
Therefore, the bank with the anonymous credit account 
does not need to know the individual’s identity. At the 
end of the month, or when the credits are all used, the 
bank with the anonymous account presents a bill to the 
credit card company, using a double-locked box that the 
individual has deposited in his account. The credit card 
company presents the individual with a bill, and when it 
is paid, the credit card company deposits additional 
credits in the anonymous account. 
An individual makes purchases in two phases, first he 
convinces the bank with the anonymous account that he 
is authorized to draw on that account, then he instructs 
that bank to transfer funds to the store’s bank. 
Mechanisms that an individual can use to identify 
himself in the first phase, are described in references 1 
and 2. In the second phase, funds are transferred from 
the bank with the anonymous account to the store’s bank, 
using a double-locked box that the store gives to the 
customer with the bill. Once the funds transfer is 
complete, the store’s bank notifies the store that it as 
been paid. Since the store does not trust the individual to 
pay a bill, the store does not need to know the 
individual’s identity. The encryption and identification 
techniques required for the anonymous credit card have 
been implemented on a smart card. 
Banks and credit card companies expect to make a 
profit when credit is extended. Either the store or 
customer must expect to pay for the use of the funds, and 
the service provided by the communication exchange. 
As funds flow through this system, each party can skim 
off a percentage or a fixed amount, depending upon what 
agreements have been reached. 
3.1 Additional Services 
The basic function performed by credit cards is to 
extend credit, pay the vendor for purchases, then to bill 
credit card holder. In the previous section we have 
described how this function is performed. However, we 
also expect to be able to: 
- cancel lost cards, 
- detect unusual spending pattems, 
- receive itemized bills, 
- return purchases, and 
- challenge purchases that are charged to us. 
Cancelling a lost cards is straightforward. We report 
the loss to our credit card company, which reduces the 
credit extended to our anonymous account to zero. 
Two mechanisms are used to detect or prevent 
unusual use of the credit mechanism; 
- the amount of credit transferred f” the credit card 
company to the anonymous account is the maximum 
that can be spent, and 
- rules can be placed in the anonymous account to limit 
the rate at which charges are made, or the maximum 
for a single charge. 
Itemized bills are created, without disclosing the 
purchases, by allowing an individual to stom a sales slip 
and personal note, encrypted with a key that only he can 
decrypt, along with the charges. The encrypted list is 
transferred form the anonymous account, to the credit 
card company, and then to the individual, along with the 
bill. When the digital sales slip is signed by the store, it 
provides a proof of purchase that the customer can use to 
return an item. 
All of the messages that transfer funds are signed and 
are unique. These messages are saved for a period of 
time, as is currently required of funds transfer messages 
to banks. If a customer believes that a charge is 
erroneous, he can challenge it through the bank with the 
anonymous account. This bank has a signed message 
from the communications exchange authorizing the funds 
transfer. The bank presents this message to the 
communications exchange with an order f” the 
customer to challenge the purchase. In order to prevent a 
bank from initiating a trace on its own, a separate 
organization issues these orders. The communications 
exchange keeps a log associating the message that it sent 
to the bank with the message that it received from the 
customer, that was signed by the customer’s card. If an 
erroneous charge has been made, the bank with the 
anonymous account can trace the message that it sent to 
the store’s bank to recover the funds. 
A real concem with an anonymous payment 
mechanism is the ability to use it for illegitimate 
purposes. In this system, the linkages between customers 
and stores can be traced. If the equivalent of an 
electronic subpoena is issued against an individual, the 
billing messages can locate the anonymous accounts and 
the charging messages can locate the stores. Similarly, a 
subpoena against a store can force the store’s bank to 
trace the messages transferring funds into the store’s 
account back to the customers’ anonymous accounts and 
from there back to the individuals. This is a secure 
tracking method, since the individuals cannot erase 
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Figure 2. The Participants in an Anonymous Credit Card 
messages in the trusted banks or the communications 
exchange. 
3.2 Collusion 
In the anonymous credit card, since the messages in 
the system are unique, it is always possible to collude 
along the message path linking two pieces of 
information. For instance, the store knows the purchases 
and the credit card company knows the customer’s 
identity. If a store does not eavesdrop on the messages 
from its customers, the message path linking the store to 
the credit card company, as shown in figure 2, includes 
the store, the store’s bank, the bank with the anonymous 
account, the credit card company, and the 
communications exchange. Depending upon whether or 
not the same communications exchange is used for all 
transactions, either five, six, or seven parties must 
collude to associate a customer’s identity and purchases. 
If the store listens to the customer’s messages, the 
number of parties that must collude is reduced to four or 
five, the store, the bank with the anonymous account, the 
credit card company, and one or two communications 
exchanges. 
The collusion path can be reduced if two parties share 
a unique piece of information. For instance, if the credit 
card system is small so that the time and amount of a 
purchase is unique, then the store and bank with the 
anonymous account, which both know this amount, can 
collude. The additional parties that must collude to learn 
the customer’s identity are the communications exchange 
and the credit card company, so that the number of 
parties that must collude is reduced to four. When there 
are several banks with anonymous accounts, this is a 
weaker attack than following the message path because 
the store cannot be certain that it is colluding with the 
correct bank. 
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3 3  Related Applkations 
3.3.1 Digital Cush The electronic funds transfer 
mechanisms developed for the anonymous credit card 
can be used as a replacement for digital cash. To 
construct a digital cash system from the anonymous 
credit card a user physically deposits funds in an 
anonymous account. Since credit is not extended to the 
individual, there is no need to know his identity. As a 
result, there is no way to associate a person's purchases 
and identity. 
a user 
obtains sequences of bits that represent cash. 
Communications, processing and bookkeeping are 
required to make certain that a user does not duplicate the 
bits and spend them more than once. In addition, 
cryptographic techniques are relied upon to prevent a 
user from forging sequences of bits that are mistaken for 
cash. 
When digital cash is implemented with the funds 
transfer mechanisms used in the anonymous credit card, 
the bits representing cash remain in trusted banks rather 
than being in a person's possession. The person cannot 
lose the bits. The bits cannot be stolen. And, the person 
cannot forge new bits. 
The main disadvantage of the funds transfer 
mechanism is that it requires communications to make 
purchases. The more advand digital cash mechanisms 
enable a user to "spend the bits without communicating 
with a checking agency while the bits are being spent. At 
a later time the bits are sent to a central processing 
agency. If the bits are "spent" once, the spender is 
anonymous. If the bits are "spent" more than once, the 
spender's identity is revealed. 
3.3.2 Paying for Network Services In a commercial 
network environment, such as that being established on 
the Internet, electronic payment mechanisms are needed 
to make it possible for small businesses to start 
~ p . " ~ " ~ ' ~  It is not adequate to provide secure 
mechanisms to transfer credit card numbers. An 
individual may trust a large company, like Sear's, not to 
misuse a credit card number, but has no reason to trust an 
unknown individual. In addition, it is not always 
possible for new buisnesses to obtain mercantile accounts 
with credit card companies. In order to make it easier to 
start new businesses, electronic cash or credit 
mechanisms should be used to transfer funds. 
Anonymity in a network environment is more 
difficult to obtain than when a person enters a store. 
When a person enters a store and carries his purchases 
out, there is no reason for the store owner to know the 
person's identity. However, if the individual wants the 
goods delivered, then he must disclose where he lives. 
In most digital cash 
Unfortunately, a network is like the second case rather 
than the first. In order to become anonymous, the 
recipients network address must be obscured. 
Conventional ways to hide addresses on a network are to: 
1. communicate through an inmedmy that 
forwards messages from a source to a destination, 
2. post information, encrypted with the recipients 
secret key, in a public place or broadcast it, or 
3. place calls through a telephone company that is 
trusted not to provide "Caller ID." 
It is possible to use the anonymous credit card 
without hiding network addresses. However, complete 
anonymity may be useful when there are a large number 
of small transactions between two parties. Instead of 
transferring funds for each transaction, a customer can 
transfer funds at the beginning of a session and trust the 
vendor to return the unused funds. If the user is 
anonymous, there is more reason for the vendor to be 
honest since the recipient may be a network checker. 
3.3.3 Electronic Document Distribution It has been 
noted that a major impediment to electronic document 
distribution is the relative ease with which electronic 
documents can be copied and redistributed. In order to 
protect a publisher's revenues, it has been proposed that 
each copy of an electronic document that a publisher 
distributes be made unique and registered to the 
individual who ordered it.'3s14 When illicit copies of a 
document are located, a publisher can use the unique 
characteristics to determine the original recipient. 
A straightforward implementation of document 
marking requires publishers to create a reading profile for 
an individual. This invades an individual's privacy and, 
if the reading is work related, will concern employers. 
The anonymous credit card provides a means of 
balancing the interests of both the individuals and the 
publishers. 
If articles are payed for with the anonymous credit 
card, the publisher doesn't need to know the purchaser's 
identity to discourage redistribution. The publisher can 
associate the message that veriiied that funds were 
transferred with the copy of the article. If multiple 
copies are located, a subpoena can be obtained to force 
the collusion needed to disclose the purchaser's identity. 
4. National Health Insurance 
The national health insurance plan presents an 
interesting application where an individual's right to 
privacy and society's need to control spending conflict. 
Most individuals feel that any medical or psychiatric 
treatment that they receive is between them and their 
physicians. Society has a responsibility to monitor any 
programs that it pays for, so that the programs are not 
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abused. These apparently conflicting goals can be 
resolved by the privacy mechanisms that have been 
described. 
The system can be set up as shown in figure 3. An 
individual has a personal account in a bank that knows 
his identity, an anonymous account with a health 
insurance company, and an anonymous account in a 
database of medical histories, as well as an anonymous 
credit card. 
A person’s complete medical history is stored in the 
anonymous account in the medical history database. 
Since the database is c o ~ e ~ t e d  to the communications 
network, the medical history is available anywhere, 
anytime. 
An employer, the government, or the individual 
deposits funds to pay insurance premiums into the 
personal account. Payments are made to the insurance 
company using the double-locked box protocol. The 
insurance company does not know the individual’s 
identity, but has a double-locked box to the medical 
history account that is used to determine premiums and 
pay for medical services. It also has a double-locked box 
for the personal account, to present bills to the individual. 
When a person acesses this database to make the 
information available to a health care provider, he uses a 
smart card and proves his identity the same way he does 
before making a purchase with the anonymous credit 
card. Afte.r treatment, the health care provider sends the 
information needed for insurance coverage and fume 
treatment to the person’s medical history account, using a 
double-locked box that it received with the patient 
information. Although funds are not transferred in this 
operation, trust is. The message from the health care 
provider is signed. The communications exchange 
verifies that the message is from a registered health care 
provider, and sends a message that it signs to the medical 
history database. The medical history database trusts the 
communications exchange to have checked the 
credentials of the health care provider, and enters the 
information into the account. 
The entry that the health care provider makes in the 
medical history database also contains a double-locked 
box for his own bank account so that the insurance 
company will be able to pay his bill. After an individual 
receives medical treatment, he instructs his insurance 
company to pay for the service. The insurance company 
uses the double-locked box that accesses the individual’s 
medical history file to obtain the bill and the double- 
locked box for the medical provider’s account. The bill 
is certified by the communications exchange as being 
from an authorized health care provider. The insurance 
company pays for the covered s e M c e s  and the individual 
is made aware of any expenses that were not covered. 
Presumably the remaining charges will be paid with the 
anonymous credit card, to maintain the patient’s 
anonymity. 
There is no direct link between a person’s medical 
history and his identity. Insurance companies can audit 
medical history accounts on a regular basis without 
compromising an individual’s right to privacy. If the 
insurance company suspects that an individual has 
misused his insurance policy, he must present the 
evidence to an agency that can authorize parties to 
collude in order to determine the individual’s identity. 
The medical history database can also be used for 
medical research on correlations between diseases and 
treatments without compromising individual privacy. 
The message path from an individual’s medical 
history and his identity has four or five parties, the 
medical history database, the insurance company, the 
agency that maintains personal accounts, and one or two 
communications exchanges. The message path from an 
enhy in a medical history to the health care provider has 
only the medical history database and the communication 
exchange. It is more difficult in this system to 
compromise an individual’s privacy than that of a health 
care provider. 
A model where an individual goes to a health care 
provider and proves his identity to obtain information 
stored in a medical history database is reasonable for 
many health care situations. It is not adequate for 
emergency situations when a person is unable to use, or 
does not have, his identifmtion card. One means to 
obtain information in an emergency is to establish a 
server that associates biometric identiliers for individuals 
and double-locked boxes for medical history accounts. 
In an emergency the health care provider sends a signed 
message with the biometric identifier through a 
communications exchange to the emergency server. The 
communications exchange verifies that the health care 
provider is legitimate. The emergency server uses the 
double-locked box to request the medical history and 
forwards it to the health care provider. 
5. Generalhation of Collusion Analysis 
As we have gone through the examples in this paper, 
it should be evident that collusion analysis is equivalent 
to finding the paths in a graph. The accounts in banks 
and the transactions in the intermediaries are nodes in the 
graph. Whenever there is information in two nodes that 
can be identilied as belonging to the same individual, 
then a link exists between the nodes. The minimum 
number of parties that must collude to associate the two 
pieces of information is one plus the shortest path 
between the nodes with the information. 
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Figure 3. The Participants in the National Health Insurance 
Certain messages in the applications must be unique. 
A graph with links corresponding to the unique messages 
determines the maximum number of parties that must 
collude. In order to achieve this upper bound, the rest of 
the information at the nodes is distributed so that no 
shorter paths are created. In the anonymous credit card 
and national health insurance applications, the upper 
bound can be realized. 
The shortest path analysis is a first step toward 
performing collusion analysis, but does not provide the 
complete answer. The next step should take into account 
how difficult or how likely it is that unique, identifiable 
pieces of information can be used for collusion. In the 
message passing case, nodes are able to determine the 
other nodes that share the unique information. There are 
also instances in which multiple sites share a unique 
piece of information, but don’t know the location of the 
other site, and instances in which the information isn’t 
completely unique. 
There are different degrees of difficulty in associating 
a message source and destination in communications 
networks. The funds transfer messages in the 
anonymous credit card are unique and identify the source 
and destination to the application. In the Internet, 
packets are addressed so that the source must know the 
destination address. When an acknowledgement is 
expected, the destination must also know the source 
address. Information about the source and destination is 
available at the network layer, rather than in the 
application, and can be made less accessible to the user. 
When communications occurs in a switched network, 
such as the telephone network, the source and destination 
need not have access to each other’s identity, but the 
network that established the circuit must. Collusion is 
more difficult because it involves another party. 
When two sites have common information that can be 
used to collude, but the sites do not know each other’s 
identity, collusion is more difficult. For instance, assume 
that a person has credit cards in two out of one hundred 
credit card companys, and each credit card company 
knows his social security number. If some of the credit 
card companies collude, the probability that the two 
companies with the common social security number are 
colluding is less than one. More parties must collude, on 
the average, to combine information than when the 
source and destination can identify each other. 
When a piece of information at two sites is not 
unique, but has a probability of belonging to the same 
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individual, then a degree of collusion becomes possible. 
The ability to collude increases as the probability that the 
information belongs to the same individual increases. 
For instance, if an individual receives a credit card bill 
for a specific amount and an anonymous account issues a 
bill for the same amount, then there is a probability that 
they both apply to the same individual. If two successive 
bills that the anonymous account issues and the 
individual receives are the same, then the likelihood that 
the bills apply to the same individual increases. As the 
sequence of identical bills increases, so does the 
likelihood that they belong to the same individual. It is 
possible to collude at any point, but the confidence in the 
result of the collusion becomes higher as the probability 
increases. 
Collusion analysis can be generalized to take into 
account the difficulty in obtaining information, the 
likelihood that useful sites will collaborate, or the 
uncertainty in information, by associating weights with 
the paths in the graphs. The generalized analysis 
indicates that collusion is easier when two parties that 
have unique information know each other's identity, than 
when they do not. Therefore, it is worth hiding the 
identities. 
The techniques described in section 3.3.2, to hide the 
source and destination when transmitting information in 
a network, can be used to increase the difficulty of 
collusion. For instance, the broadcast mechanism can be 
used in a sysyem that requires acknowledgements if 
- The source transmits to an unknown destination by 
encrypting a message with a key supplied by the user. 
The message is broadcast to all destinations, but only 
the destination with the decryption key can receive it. 
- If the source supplies its own key in the message, 
then the destination can use the broadcast channel to 
acknowledge the message without knowing the 
source. 
6. Conclusion 
The tools presented in this work provide the means to 
design a range of applications that balance the rights of 
an individual to preserve his privacy, and the rights of 
society to protect the interests of the group. The proper 
balance between an individual's rights and society's 
needs are not addressed. 
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